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Abstract: 
This study provides the evidence of the performance of SRI funds in the UK and in France both 
before and during the financial crisis. We find that in the pre-crisis (2004-2007) period all French 
and UK funds outperformed the market. According to the modified Sharpe ratio, French and UK 
funds also outperformed during the crisis period (2007-2009) when compared with relative 
market benchmarks. This result is not confirmed by the Jensen alpha or the Treynor ratio, but 
these instruments did not indicate significant underperformance. Overall, our results show that 
while there is no significant difference in financial performance between SRI funds and non-SRI 
funds. 
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Liquidity Risk and Credit Supply during the Financial Crisis: The Case of 
German Banks 
 1.INTRODUCTION 
In a traditional financial intermediation, banks provide liquidity to the overall economy through 
transactions on their balance sheets, creating a situation of non-affiliation of their assets and 
liabilities. This activity of maturity transformation is possible because the banks are supposed to 
be better able than their depositors to make the selection and monitoring of loans and borrowers 
and the diversification of their asset portfolio and because of this, banks are able to reduce 
information asymmetries in credit markets.  
In recent decades, the financial system has developed a more efficient management of liquidity. 
Thanks to financial innovations, banks have moved from a model of "originate to hold" 
(detention and granting of credit) to an "originate to distribute" (and awarding of transfer credit) 
and rely more on market financing. This permitted further relaxation of credit constraints in the 
economy, growth of loans to be partially disconnected from that of bank deposits. 
The global credit crisis of 2007 born as a result of inadequate liquity management in the same 
way as previous financial crisis in the emerging economies.At the time of credit crisis savings in 
the financial institutions in the banks and financial markets are reduced leading towards shortage 
of allocation of credit due to deteriorating liquidity.This misallocation of investments reduces 
profitability and liquidity of financial institutions as they have to generate savings from other 
parts of the world to remain in the market. 
Before the financial crisis of 2007 banks are performing nicely and showing higher profitablity 
and lend at cheaper costs to customers but soon this reduction in liquidity created trouble for 
many governments and financial institutions because regulatory bodies and governments 
provides huge bailout packages to public financial institutions to overcome shortage of 
liquidity.The changing conditions of markets shows a challenge to regulatory bodies that how to 
manage liquidity and credit allocation. 
Regulatory bodies respond to this situation by introducing new regulations in basel III capital 
accord such as they introduced leverage and buffer capital to faciltate efficient functioning of 
financial institutions and reduced any potential chances of credit crisis in the future. Basel III 
accord try to solve the puzzle about approporite level of liquidity and capital.These complex 
regulations helps financial institutions to maintain their financial position thus reducing the 
chance of bank run.In short these regulations results in effective management of liquidity and 
capital(Diamond & Rajan 2009; King & Tarbert 2011). 
The shortage of liquidity causes many problems for financial institutions as this will restrict the 
allocation of capital for investment purpose. When this problem persists banks are unable to 
finance the new projects or continue the existing investments. Ultimately this will cause 
efficiency loss as other banks with surplus liquidity finance those projects resulted in bad 
performance than orignating financial institutions.This shows the significance of effective 
management of liquidity for profitablity of banks not only for indvidual banks but for the whole 
financial system(Wagner 2007).  
Recent financial crisis of 2007 reduces the liquidity of major financial institutions and central 
banks support public sector banks by injecting the liquidity in the system.However this strategy 
did not increase growth in the credit but it increases hoarding of cash by financial institutions for 
covering their huge losses such as Federal reserve inject liquidity in the financial system but it 
did not leads towards stimulation of credit in the economy(Cornett et al. 2011). 
This study contributes to the existing body of literature by liquidity risk and creation of credit 
using data of German banks over the period 2006-2011.As per author knowledge this is the first 
study that tried to find this relationship in the context of German financial institutions.Although 
some authors tested this relationship in European context. 
The financial system of the Germany is based on three pillars or categories based on different 
organizational and ownership structures.First category includes private banks those are large 
banks,subsidiaries of foreign banks and banks are at local level. The smaller and local banks are 
created by partnership and sole proprietorships while other larger banks at private sector 
incorporated as joint stock companies.The main activity of the public sactor banks to generate 
savings and they are owned local and national level by the government. Cooperative banks and 
credit corporations also operates in Germany.Finally German financial sector includes diverse 
financial institutions for provision of different financial services to consumers and business 
sector(Brunnermeier 2008). 
In this paper our focus is on German banks and we tried to find the relation of liquidity risk 
exposure to growth in liquid assets and growth in loans during the crisis period. We also 
contributes to existing literature by examining implications of liquidity risk exposure to credit 
supply for German banks which as per author knowledge ignored in existing literature. Our 
results enabled us to explain the major factors responsible for the decline in new credit 
creation.The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 will present the review of 
literature.While collection and research methodology is defined in the section 3 and Section 4 
will present our findings and section 5 concludes. 
2.LITERATURE REVIEW 
The creation and management of liquidity is crucial for banks and financial institutions during 
financial difficulties.They need liquidity for payment of customer obligations.The gloabal 
financial crisis is the result of inadequate management of liquidity and different markets halted 
because of this crisis.The central banks and governemts injected huge amount of liquidity to 
financial system.From above discussion one question arise that how do we define liquidity?it is 
simply the share of investments in liquid securities.It is the duty of the financial institution to 
reduce liquidity risk within and overall financial system by devising plans for effective 
management of liquid assets (Tirole 2011). 
At the time of financial difficulties banks face serius difficulties for liquidity creation and it can 
increase exposure of banks to liquidity risk.Althoug all financial institutions face these changes 
but sound management and planning hedge them from adverse trends in business cycle(Simona 
& Eugenia 2010). 
During the financial crisis banks reduced lending and holds more liquid assets.This liquidity 
exposure affected the banks in different ways;such as on the asset side some banks doubt their 
liquidity management ability and hoarded liquidity.On the other hand,banks reduced the lending 
and started relying on equity capital and bank deposits for funding purposes.(Strahan 2012). 
Gatev et al. (2007) conducted study on liquidity risk in different market situtaions and finds that 
banks with high loan liquidity risk faces more risk while during financial difficluties deposits 
plays a key role in provision of liquidity to banks. 
Lou and Sadka (2011) studied the performance of liquid and illiquid stocks during financial 
crisis.Authors compared the historical betas with historical liquidity for empirical 
investigation.They further controlled the liquidity level and finds no difference in returns of 
stocks.These findings suggest implications for better risk management techniques. 
Berger and Bouwman (2011) observed the bank performance relationship with capital and 
variation of this relationship during financial crisis.Authors finds that small banks are in a better 
position to maintain their position in the market during diffiluties.On the other hand inflows of 
capital increase performance of large banks in crisis.These results holds with robustness tests. 
Ioan et al. (2008) conducted study on the role of central banks in management of liquidity during 
dynamic changes in the financial system.They stressed the reasons behind financial crisis such as 
liquidity.Further they argued that people must be aware about such risks.Central banks intervene 
in the free market to protect some banks from bankcruptcy filing such as lending 30$ billion to 
JP morgan.Europeans wants central banks to protect them from worldwide depression and loss of 
liquidity. 
3.DATA COLLECTION AND THE METHODOLOGY 
We use the model developed by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) in which she defines four 
elements as the main factors for liquidity risk management. (1) Liquidity of assets, (2) Deposits 
as a function of total financial structure, (3) equity capital as a fraction of the financial structure, 
(4) funding liquidity exposure as a new loan generation. We build our monthly data ranges from 
January 2006 to March 2011. This includes pre-crisis period and the crisis period. Five main 
categories of banks are selected for our analysis. These include commercial banks, regional 
banks, Landsbanken, savings banks and credit unions. Our sample has observations before and 
during the crisis period. 
 We estimate and analyze the following three equations: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Our data is composed of 5 years and 3 months. Regression (1) tests how banks adjust their 
holdings of liquid assets. Regression (2) analyses how bank lending on the balance sheet adjusts 
while regression (3) investigates how total credit origination adjusts. We used explanatory 
variables in our model which include firm investment portfolio assets fraction those are illiquid 
at the beginning (Illiquid Assets/ Assetsi,t-1),Next we used firm balance sheet fraction with core 
deposits at the start of the period (Core Deposits/Assets i,t-1),risk weighted assets fraction of 
balance sheet is financed using Tier 1 capital at the beginning period (Capital/ Assetsi,t-1),Further 
we used the ration of unused to used commitments plus assets at the start of the time 
∆ Liquid Assetsi,t/Assetsi,t-1 = β
 1
 Illiquid Assets/Assets i,t-1 + β
2 
+ Illiquid Assets/Assetsi,t-1 * TEDt + 
 β
3
 Core Deposits/Assets i,t-1 + β
4
 Core Deposits/Assets i,t-1 * TED + 
β
5
Capital/Assets i,t-1 + β
6
Capital/Assetsi,t-1TED +  
β
7
Commit/(Commit +Assets) i,t-1 + β
8
Commit/(Commit +Assets) i,t-1 *TED 
+ β
9 
log Assets i,t-1 + β
10 
log Assets i,t-1*TED          [1]  
∆Loanst/Assetsi,t-1 = λ
1
Illiquid Assets/Assets i,t-1 +  λ
 2 
 Illiquid Assets/Assets i,t-1 * TEDt +  
λ
3
Core Deposits / Assets i,t-1 + λ
 4
 Core Deposits/Assets i,t-1 *TED + 
λ
5
Captal / Assets i,t-1 + λ
 6
 Capital/Assets i,t-1 * TED +  
λ
7
Commit/(Commit +Assets) i,t-1 + λ
 8
 Commit/(Commit +Assets) i,t- *TED 
+ λ
 9 
log Assets i,t-1 + λ
 10 
log Assets i,t-1*TED          [2]  
 
∆Credits,t/(Commit+Assets)i,t-1  γ
1
 Illiquid Assets/Assetsi,t-1  + γ
 2 
Illiquid Assets/Assets i,t-1  * TEDt  +  
γ
 3
 Core Deposits / Assets i,t-1 +  γ
 4
 Core Deposits/Assets i,t-1 * TED +  
γ
5
 Caiptal / Assets i,t-1 + γ
 6
 Capital/Assets i,t-1 * TED + 
γ
7
Commit/(Commit +Assets) i,t-1 + γ
8
Commit/(Commit+Assets) i,t-1 *TED  
+ γ
 9 
log Assets i,t-1 + γ
 10 
log Assets i,t-1*TED         [3]  
 
period(Commit/ (Commit+Assets) i,t-1),Finally we used the log of total assets at the beginnig 
period (Log Assets i,t-1). 
We hypothesize that during crisis period those banks with shortage of liquidity increase their 
liquid assts for credit creation and lending. 
Thus, we anticipate β>0
2
, γ
 2
<0
 
and λ
 2 
<0
 
. If during financial crisis,core deposits and capital is 
utilized as financing source,Further we expect banks with higher levels of capital and core 
deposits to be more willing to depress their liquidity buffers.Additionally, if these are stable 
sources of funding and allowed the banking institutions to remain to lend during the crisis, we 
expect γ
4
>0
 
, γ
6
>0 and λ
 4
>0
 
, λ
 6
>0. 
In recent financial crisis banks were not in a better position to grant loan securitization such as 
origination and distribution of loans is not the same as they had before the crisis period.Moreover 
liquidity situtaion of banks deteriorates at that time and liquidity of asset and mortgage backed 
securities almost came to end.By considering the above factors we expect banks with less liquid 
assets tend to increase their liquid asstets durig crisis. 
We used all these variables in regression also we checked explanatory variables interaction with 
the TED spread. TED spread is simply the difference between 3-month EURIBOR rates and 
Risk Free Rate of Germany.  
Fig I shows the TED spread for our analysis period. It is clear from the figure that TED reaches 
to its maximum value after September 2008 and then decreases afterwards.  
 
 
FIGURE I 
 
Our data consists of monthly values collected from Banking Statistics 2011 published by Central 
Bank of Germany (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK) which regulates all banks of Germany. Our 
analysis period for this paper is from January 2006 to February 2011. This will include pre-crisis 
period (from January 2006 to July 2007) and crisis period (from August 2007 to March 2011).   
Insert Table 1 Here 
4.EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section examines the relation of liquidity risk exposure to growth in liquid assets and 
growth in loans during the crisis period. We also explain implications of liquidity risk exposure 
to credit supply for German banks. 
TED Spread
january 2006 februray 2006 march 2006 april 2006
may 2006 june 2006 july 2006 august 2006
september 2006 october 2006 november 2006 december 2006
january 2007 februray 2007 march 2007 april 2007
may 2007 june 2007 july 2007 august 2007
september 2007 october 2007 november 2007 december 2007
january 2008 februray 2008 march 2008 april 2008
may 2008 june 2008 july 2008 august 2008
Private banks 
Results in Table 2 underscore that Illiquid Assets/Assetsi,t-1 * TEDt  is the only coefficient that is 
significant for the Eq. (1) which  shows that during the crisis period, illiquid assets of Private 
Banks decreased which shows that liquid assets of banks increased. Similarly to equation (3) 
coefficient of Commit/(commit +assets)i,t-1 *TED and log assets i,t-1 are significantly positive 
which show that banks can have more credit. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
Public Sector Bank 
Table II presents the results of regional bank regression. The results of regression (2) show that 
assets of banks have significant positive value and they have more money available for lending. 
Equation (3) shows the banks have significant positive value of deposits and commitments which 
indicate that they have adequate deposits for lending. It means that lending and deposits have the 
positive relation. 
Insert Table 3 Here 
5.CONCLUSION 
During the recent financial crisis banks liquidity situation deteriorates as financial institutions 
and  markets are halted and markets for mortgage and asset backed securities are crashed 
specially in USA. The increase in the use of assets as collateral has been one of the causes of the 
financial crisis. By contagion, an aggravating factor has emerged: the non-performing assets 
have eliminated the flow of huge amounts of assets. Some of which were of good quality. The 
proliferation of off-balance sheet structures involved in maturity transformation was an 
additional factor destabilizing the markets. These structures, lack of "safety cushions" that 
provide the capital, found unable to hold illiquid long as investors have decided not to renew 
short-term lending to these structures, which caused a wave of forced sales and hence lower 
prices. Channels of  liquidity provision depends on the structured and securitized assets are, by 
their very nature, fragile: they rely on innovative instruments, lack of secondary markets deep 
and robust. The opacity and complexity of the products have constituted major obstacles to the 
emergence of such secondary markets and the availability of observable market prices. 
In this study,our findings indicates that private banks with less liquid assets increased liquidity 
with reduction in lending to customers.Further we find that banks prefer to rely on stable source 
of financing for instance core deposits and high quality capital and they continued 
lending.Liquidity risk(off-balance sheet) which is in the form of withdrawn loan obligations is 
appeared as borrowers drew on prior commitments in huge quantities.In conclusion our findings 
shows that public banks with more assets tend to lend more and those banks with more core 
deposits most effectively use their credit lines. 
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Table I: Number of banks in Germany examined between 2006 and March 2011.  
This table lists the distribution of the sample banks by year.We segregate banks into five kinds of banks commercial banks, 
regional banks, Landerbanken, savings banks and credit. The data are collected from Banking Statistics 2011 published by 
Central Bank of Germany (http://www.bundesbank.de/index.en.php). 
Bank 
Category/Year 
No. of Banks Bank Category/Year No. of Banks 
Commercial banks 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
            2010-11 
 Regional banks 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
            2010-11 
 
255 
258 
271 
274 
280 
158 
158 
163 
164 
168 
Landsbanken 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009 
2010-11 
  
12 
12 
11 
10 
10 
Savings banks 
2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010-11 
       
              458 
448 
444 
434 
430 
Credit Unions                                     Big banks  
             2006 
 2007 
 2008 
 2009 
 2010-11 
1294 
1257 
1228 
1157 
             1140 
 
              2006  
2007  
2008  
2009  
2010-11 
2222 
2295 
2143 
2878 
2314 
 
 
TABLE II               REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON PRIVATE BANKING 
These tables report regressions of monthly growth in liquid assets standardized by beginning of period assets of commercial 
banks.The data are observed monthly over the period 2006 to 2011. TED spread is the difference between 6-month EURIBOR 
rates and Risk Free Rate of Germany. The data are collected from Banking Statistics 2011 published by Central Bank of 
Germany (http://www.bundesbank.de/index.en.php). ***, **, and * denote that the coefficients are statistically 
significantlydifferentfromzeroatthe1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Illiquid Assets/Assets i,t-
1 + 
0,004 
(0,962) 
0,131 
(1,069) 
0,140 
(1,130) 
Illiquid Assets/Assetsi,t-1 
* TEDt 
-0,013* 
(-1,862) 
-0,92 
(-0,423) 
-0,0124 
(-0,565) 
Core Deposits/Assets i,t-
1 + 
0,000 
(0,037) 
0,161 
(0,947) 
0,162 
(0,950) 
Core Deposits/Assets i,t-
1 * TED 
0,005 
(0,621) 
0,256 
(1,084) 
0,270 
(1,137) 
Capital / Assets i,t-1 -0,046 
(-1,108) 
-0,968 
(-0,776) 
-1,006 
(-0,801) 
Capital/Assets i,t-1 * 
TED 
0,014 
(0,414) 
1,041 
(1,016) 
1,021 
(0,99) 
Commit/(Commit 
+Assets) i,t-1 
-0,017 
(-0682) 
-1,147 
(-1,49) 
-1,167 
(-1,506) 
Commit/(Commit 
+Assets)i,t-1 *TED 
0,001 
(0,037 
1,847 
(1,675) 
1,864* 
(1,68) 
Log Assets i,t-1 0,005 
(0,660) 
0,715* 
(2,773) 
0,725* 
(2,095) 
Log Assets i,t-1*TED 0,001 
(0,878) 
-0,065* 
(-1,965) 
-0,630 
(-1,891) 
R
2
 (%) 18,9 23,1 23 
*,**,*** 
show values are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
 
